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Abstract
Mobile  agents  traverse  the  Internet,  often  on  behalf  of  their  users.  Intelligent  search  agents  access
information  in  dynamic  heterogeneous  environments.  The legal  and technical  implications  of  the  use  of
agents in such situations are not fully understood. In this paper a scenario in which a mobile agent searches a
multimedia database on behalf of its user, is used to provide a common ground for discussion of the legal and
technical  issues  involved.  Requirements  related  to  identity  management,  integrity,  traceability  and
availability are identified and discussed in the context of existing technology.
1 Introduction
Mobile  agents  traverse  the  Internet,  moving  to  different  sites  with  different  characteristics.  Mobile
intelligent  search  agents  access  information  in  heterogeneous,  often  dynamic,  environments.  The  legal
implications of the use of agents in such situations are not fully understood.  This paper discusses a number
of issues related to identity management,  integrity,  traceability and availability, continuing the research
done within the context of the ALIAS project  phase I, in which legal implications of the use of agent
systems are investigated from both a legal and a technological perspective [1]. 
Software agents themselves are assumed to have the following properties [2]: (1) autonomy (they
have control over their own actions and state); (2) social ability (they can communicate with other agents);
(3) reactivity (they react to changes in its environment); (4) pro-activeness (they make plans to reach their
goals and can take initiative to pursue these). Additionally, agents are assumed to be intelligent (they can
reason, learn and adapt) and mobile (they can move between network-connected computers). Klusch [4]
defines “intelligent information agents” as “autonomous computational software entities that are especially
meant to (1) provide a proactive resource discovery, (2) resolve information impedance of information
consumers and providers, and (3) offer value-added information services and products.” This definition
suffices to define the types of software agents to which this paper refers. 
In this paper, a scenario in which a mobile search agent searches a multimedia database on behalf of its
user is used to illustrate the legal and technical issues involved, identifying a number of requirements. It is
* An earlier version of this paper has been published in the proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on the Law
and Electronic Agents 2005 (LEA ’05), available on lea-online.net.
beyond the scope of this paper to provide an overview of all related research: literature on intelligent search
agents (e.g.  [4]  and [30])  and personal assistant agents (e.g.  [31])  clearly influences this work as does
research on agent platforms and mobile agent security issues (e.g. work by Borselius [5], Cubillos [6] and
Bellavista [7]). Protection of intellectual property (see for example [35] and [36]) is only briefly addressed.
2 A multimedia retrieval scenario
In this scenario, mobile agents are used to access information across the Internet: information stored in a
remote  multimedia  database.  Mobility  has  many potential  benefits,  which  can  be  grouped  into  three
categories: performance, resource access and security [3]. In this context, the most important advantage is
that it provides the multimedia database service provider the option to exercise control over data returned to
the users of mobile agents. This prevents possible misuse of the data, e.g. infringement of copyright. 
The scenario is as follows. A user interacts with an intelligent search agent, which helps the user to
find snippets of movies in multimedia databases. An example search task could be to find a snippet of a
movie picturing a scene of a dog riding a bike. In this scenario the location of the multimedia database
service  provider  is  assumed  to  be  trusted  and  the  address  known.  Agents  are  also  assumed  to  have
appropriate credentials for access, e.g. have a login or signed certificates.
Next, an agent contacts the remote site to which it wishes to migrate. If the remote location is
willing to host the agent and is willing and capable of providing the necessary resources (i.e., in this case,
access  to  the  multimedia  database),  the  agent  migrates  to  the  remote  location.  The  certification,
authentication and search processes are not addressed in this paper.
Once the search task has been completed, this scenario assumes that the agent returns the results to
its user, e.g. by contacting a guardian agent provided by the hosting location (as proposed by Noordende
[9]). The guardian agent notifies the user and provides low-quality streams of the video snippets for pre-
view purposes. Once the user has the information he/she was looking for, a next step is that final terms can
be arranged, e.g. a high quality download or shipment can be arranged along with payment options.
Figure 1: User and Service Provider
The scenario as described above is depicted in Figure 1. The desired information cannot be found in the
user’s domain, but is available at a remote location. Both the agent’s original and the remote location have
the necessary middleware, i.e. agent platform software, to host agents and perform services (e.g. migration
and communication). In Figure 1 the remote location is in the domain of the multimedia database service
provider. At the physical level a network connection, e.g. Internet or a mobile phone network, enables
communication between the agent platform locations.
3 Legal and security issues
In the multimedia retrieval  scenario,  four types of entities are involved: the user,  the search agent, the
service provider and the agent platform. The service provider is represented by the platform (in the scenario
we assume the service provider to be the platform owner but that is not necessarily the case) and an agent
represents a user. Both forms of representation are aspects of identity management, which is elaborated
upon in the next section. For a reliable service, the integrity of both the agent and the agent platform needs
to be guaranteed. Integrity is treated in 3.2. From the moment the agent contacts the platform to negotiate,
logs are kept of the activities engaged in by every agent on the platform. Issues of logging and tracing are
addressed in section 3.3. Finally, availability of the platform is an essential part of the performance offered
to the agent, which is covered in 3.4. 
3.1 Identity management
Identity management in agent  systems is  important  for  various reasons.  First  of  all  for  the purpose of
administrating  which  entities  (users,  agents,  services,  locations)  are  in  the  system.  Secondly,  identity
management is needed for the application of access policies to determine who is allowed to do what and
with which credentials.  Based on this information, access policies may be enforced, e.g. a migrating agent
may need  to  provide  details  and  proof  of  its  affiliation  to  gain  access  to  a  specific  location.  Other
information about agents may also be needed, such as the agent owner, user, company and programmer. For
example in our scenario, a service provider may have special agreements with different categories of clients
(e.g. with a large television company) in which the agreement states that agents of the client are to be run on
a dedicated machine with a guaranteed quality of service and security. Thirdly, identity management is
needed for logging and tracing purposes. 
Note that there is an apparent discrepancy between a possible wish for anonymity of an agent user
on the one hand and the service provider’s possible need to know the exact identity of the user of the
visiting agent  on the other  hand [11,  12].  For  example,  a  user  may wants his/her agent  to  search the
multimedia database without others knowing what (kind of) movie(s) the agent is searching. On the other
hand, when an error has occurred, e.g. due to a malfunctioning agent, the service provider may need to trace
which events happened and determine whose agent is responsible (and whether the user is liable). Thus, a
balance between the user’s need for anonymity and the interests of the service provider of the multimedia
database service is needed. 
Requirement 1:  Agents and users need to be locally identitifiable
In our scenario of an agent searching for movie snippets requested by his/her user, this implies that different
levels of knowledge on the identity of both agent and user may be required in different phases of the agent’s
activities. Four different levels of knowledge on identities can be distinguished: untraceable anonymity,
traceable anonymity, untraceable pseudonymity and traceable pseudonymity [1,12].  When searching the
multimedia database, the real user’s identity may not be needed and traceable pseudonymity would suffice.
However, when buying a movie, a user’s true identity may be needed to complete the transaction (e.g. for
credit card payment, submitting a cardholders’ name is required).
 
Requirement 2:  Agent and user identity information need to be managed.
For  users  locally  unique identifiers  (LUIDs)  or  local  names can function as  pseudonyms in a  specific
environment. A user’s real identity may only be known to a Trusted Third Party (TTP), the TTP also knows
the mapping of real identities and local names. If needed, the TTP could provide more information about a
user:  reveal  a  user’s identity or  show links between various local  names (e.g.  for  profiling purposes).
Likewise, an agent can have a unique identity acquired upon creation that is known to a TTP but uses local
names when deemed appropriate. An example of an approach to agent identity administration is described
by Roth [10].
Managing these different levels of knowledge regarding identity information in different phases,
termed “multi-phased identity management” is needed.  How this should be done and who should be in
charge  of  the  administration  is  still  subject  of  research.  Related  research  includes  Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PET), for example the MASKs System [32], PRIME1 and PISA [37].
3.2 Integrity
To ensure correct functioning of a multimedia database, the integrity of both an agent platform and visiting
agents is  essential. In other words, it is crucial that the data and transmissions are not “unduly altered,
erased or supplemented and that the physical objects involved (…) are not damaged or destroyed.”2 
Protection of entities
Current  research in this  matter  concentrates  on  prevention  of  attacks  on  hosts  of  agent  platforms [7].
However, a host in an agent platform could also modify the data and code of an agent, e.g. by changing a
value of a variable and thereby causing the agent to recommend more expensive movies.  Furthermore,
agents can attack each other. For example, in our scenario a user agent could attack the guardian agent of
the service provider. If the service provider disables direct communication between a user and its agent, a
user has no means to verify whether its agent or its messages have been tampered with, until the agent
leaves the remote location. Thus, as Yee points out as well, protection and detection measures to safeguard
the integrity of the agent and its computation are needed [13]. 
 
Requirement 3: Protection and detection measures are needed to safeguard the integrity of the
agent and agent platform.
Both Borselius [5] and Cubillos [6] give an overview of protection measures for agent platforms and agents.
Example measures for platform protection are sandboxing or jailing of agents and the use of signed code [9,
14, 15]. Note that code signing is also useful for agent protection and detection of changes. Other measures
for agent protection described include using trusted nodes, execution tracing [16] and encryption of code
and functions [17]. Examples of other approaches are watermarking and fingerprinting of agents [18], code
obfuscation [19], re-execution of agents [20], semantic encryption [21], and integrity based encryption [22].
Protection of agent data
A mobile agent carries data, which may be relatable to its user, e.g. the search request of the user, itinerary,
passwords and usernames, etc. The host can observe any unencrypted agent data, however, confiscation and
modification of these data is obviously undesirable [23].
Several types of data possessed by an agent can be distinguished, for example: assignment (search
request), itinerary, credentials, internal logs, and gathered information. All of these data need protection and
appropriate detection measures to safeguard their integrity.
Requirement 4: Protection and detection measures are needed to safeguard agent data.
Measures for agent protection, as listed above, can often be used to protect the agent data as well. Another
technique for protecting the agent state (and detecting changes) is introduced in Ajanta: signed append-only
containers for agent data [14]. This approach is followed in Mansion [9] and AgentScape [15]. Examples of
other protection techniques are partial result protection [24] and detecting attempts of tampering [25].
Additionally, protection is needed for the data located in the domain of service provider, e.g. logs
and identity administration of the agent platform and contents of the multimedia database. For example, in
the scenario, a mobile agent interacts with the multimedia database and processes a number of items. Any
one of the items could be confiscated or communicated (e.g. via covert channels) to a third party. This is
obviously undesirable and should be prevented. 
1  http://www.prime-project.eu.org/
2  The definition of integrity we use is cited from [1], p. 53 below.
Protection of host data
The multimedia database and its content are protected by intellectual property regulations. In the EU, if a
multimedia database matches certain requirements, it may be protected under database law. If that is the
case, searching the multimedia database requires the rightholders’ consent. 
Also, the contents of a multimedia database are likely to be protected by copyright. The copyright
holder may want to keep as much control on the movie snippets as possible, in an effort to prevent future
copyright infringement. Not only the copying of an entire copyrighted movie, but also the copying of parts
of  it  could  entail  copyright  infringement.  Movie  snippets  can  therefore  not  be  extracted  without  the
rightholders’ consent. If the service provider is not the copyrights holder, he/she will need permission from
the copyright holder to exploit the database and permit others to search the copyrighted items. If the agent
copies items from the database without the rightholder’s consent, the agent infringes copyright, for which its
user is responsible. 
Requirement 5: Protection and detection measures are needed to safeguard the data of the agent
platform.
An option to safeguard content data is to inspect an agent before it  leaves a platform and to disenable
communication. Another option is to agree in advance that an agent will terminate after handing a message
transferring  its  desired  items (or  their  identifiers)  to  a  guardian  agent.  Noordende  suggests  the  latter
approach [9]. 
Protection of transmissions
Communications between entities in agent platforms need to be secured, e.g. to prevent reading or re-play
by third parties. Communication needs to be secured if it takes place over unsafe or unreliable network
connections,  e.g.  migration of  the agent in the scenario from the user  location to  the service provider
location.  Depending on the  application and architecture  of  the platform,  agent-to-agent  communication
should be secured.
Requirement 6: Protection and detection measures are needed to safeguard the integrity of the
transmissions.
Generally, standard encryption techniques and (public/private) cryptographic key architectures suffice. This
is one of the basic security issues being covered in many agent systems. Related issues are non-repudiation
(where it cannot be denied afterwards that a message has been sent), authenticity (guarantees the sender is
the actual sender) and guaranteed delivery. Realization of secured agent-to-agent communication may be
problematic if the agent platform cannot be trusted.
3.3 Logs and traceability
Logging communication  and  actions  of  entities  in  the  system to  reconstruct  an agent’s  interactions  is
particularly useful if damage is incurred. For example,  if and when a content provider  discovers that a
particular snippet from the multimedia database is circulating among Internet users without authorization,
the content provider may want to know who was responsible. To find out who was responsible, the content
provider will both need to have logged which agent accessed which movies and be able to identify the user
of this particular agent. Secondly, logging is needed to trace errors in the system. If the platform logs show
that one of the visiting agents is overusing the service, e.g. because it is consuming more resources then
agreed before it was allowed on the system, the particular agent should be found and perhaps even killed
(some issues which need to be considered in deciding whether or not to kill a mobile agent are discussed in
[33]). Thirdly, logs can be used in the process of determining liability, e.g. when a denial of service has
occurred which has caused much damage and the logs may show which specific agent was responsible.
Fourthly, logs can be used to determine where and when an agent has been tampered with.
Requirement 7: Logging of communication and actions of entities is necessary.
Requirement 8: Agents need to be uniquely identifiable.  
Because of the distributed nature of the system, there is no single solution for all situations. Who should log
what, where and how? If logging is done locally, and/or by agents, logged information could be lost when a
node or an agent fails. Updating information is complex and intricate, certainly when malicious hosts are
possible. Notions and models of trust play a role in the update policies for distributed logging. Further
research in this area is needed. 
Requirement 9: Logs must be robust and should not disappear because of a failing node.
Among the data that is logged, there may be personal data that is reducible to the agent’s user. If this is the
case,  privacy  regulations  play  a  vital  role.  For  example,  gathering  information  on  a  personal  agent's
searching habits could amount to a profile containing personal data of the agent’s user. In the EU, any
processing of personal data is subject to detailed regulations.3 
Requirement 10: User privacy needs to be respected in accordance with privacy regulations.
In most cases, a user explicitly has to consent to the processing of any personal data. Therefore, an agent
platform must either anonymise any user data to the extent that the data is not reducible to an individual
user, or the user has to explicitly consent in use of personal data before the data is processed. In certain
circumstances, anonymisation of logged data may conflict with the service provider’s need for traceability.
On the other hand, when explicit consent of the user is needed, the question arises whether it is possible for
an agent to consent to the use of personal data of its user. 
Additionally,  both logs and the identity administration need to  be safeguarded e.g.  to  prevent
agents from maliciously changing logs. Unwanted access to the logs and other administration by users and
agents should be prevented, also with regard to privacy issues as described above. It needs to be determined
who is allowed to access which logging data and under which circumstances. 
Requirement 11: Unauthorized access to the logs and administrative data should be prevented.
3.4 Availability
Before an agent can start searching the multimedia database, it will first try to negotiate an agreement with
the agent platform that offers access to the multimedia database service. The platform and the visiting agent
must use the same protocols to negotiate. An agreement is needed in which both the facilities provided by
the platform (both resources and services) and the procedures on the platform (e.g. whether the agent can
communicate with its user while the agent is on the platform and whether the agent’s process is terminated
after  it  has  finished  its  search)  are  defined.  In  addition  to  the  above  agreement,  an  agent  may want
guarantees on the level of performance offered by an agent platform. An essential element of performance is
availability. Availability is a hard requirement for an agent to be able to successfully complete its search in
the multimedia database. The level of performance provided to the visiting agent, including availability, can
be agreed upon in so-called Service Level agreements (SLAs) [27, 28, 29].  
Whether an SLA that has been agreed upon by an agent and an agent platform can be regarded as a
legally valid  contract,  is  uncertain.  To  establish a legally valid  contract,  two persons have  to  perform
corresponding  acts  of  offer  and  acceptance.  Since  neither  agents,  nor  agent  platforms  can  as  yet  be
considered to be legal entities, the offer and acceptance by an agent and an agent platform must be reduced
to both the agent’s user and the platform owner. Without two legal entities having the will to establish
certain  legal  consequences,  it  is  uncertain whether  there  can  be  a  valid  contract  (see  for  an elaborate
analysis [34]).
However, if an agent’s user gives an agent a specific assignment (in our scenario: to find and buy a
specific movie) and also a specific amount of e-cash the agent is allowed to spend, the question arises
whether the user’s will was not only directed at closing a contract concerning the purchase of that particular
movie, but also at establishing an “underlying” contract between the agent and the platform. If this is the
case, there may be a valid contract between the agent user and the platform owner.
Requirement 12: Clear and legally valid agreements are needed.
3  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 regards any data that can be
traced to an individual as personal data. 
Further research in this area is needed, both to exactly determine the circumstances under which an SLA
can be regarded as a valid contract, and to maintain a balance between the agents’ autonomy and legal
validity of the agreements it concludes. 
4 Technical considerations
Often,  agent  applications  and  multi-agent  systems  are  supported  by  agent  platforms.  Also  the  above-
proposed scenario can be implemented in an agent platform. An agent platform is middleware (a software
layer between the operating system and the application programs) that provides an execution environment
for agents. Generally, an agent platform offers facilities and services to agents on the platform, for example
facilities  for  communication  and  life-cycle  support  (starting,  pausing,  resuming,  deleting  agents)  and
services like a Directory Service (White and Yellow Pages to find agents and services). In addition, agent
platforms can offer support for migration and security. Examples of agent platforms are AgentScape [15],
SeMoa4, JADE5 and Cougaar6. A short description of JADE and Cougaar and a comparison of the platforms
with AgentScape are given by Overeinder [15]. 
The scenario could for example be implemented in JADE or the AgentScape agent platform. Both
platforms  provide  the  necessary  basic  functionalities  and  features.  Therefore,  in  relation  with  those
platforms a further consideration of the requirements in relation to the features of the agent platforms is
presented here.
JADE
JADE [38,  39,  40]  stands  for  Java  Agent  Development  Environment  and  is  a  FIPA-compliant  agent
platform. Each instance of the JADE run-time environment is called a container (since it “contains” agents).
A group of connected containers is called a platform; multiple containers can run simultaneously on one
singe computer system or per container on multiple network-connected machines. The JADE agent platform
provides a homogeneous layer that hides the complexity and the diversity of the underlying tiers (hardware,
operating  systems,  types  of  network,  JVM)  from  users  and  developers.  JADE  supports  weak  agent
migration, from container to container within the platform, by means of Java-serialization. 
JADE-S  [39],  the  secured  version  of  JADE,  supports  multiple  users  on  the  platform,  user
authentication,  agent  actions  authorization  and  message  signing  and  encryption.  With  respect  to  the
requirements listed in this article  the JADE-S agent platform is considered.  Requirements 1  and 2 are
satisfied due to the multi-user security additions. Furthermore, message signatures and encryption satisfies
the requirement on safeguarding the integrity of transmissions. Logging facilities are available (on a per-
container basis) and are based on the JAVA java.util.logging package. Hence requirements (7 and 9) on
logging of communication and actions of entities may be satisfied if appropriate configuration settings are
applied. Requirement 8 demands unique identifiability of agents, which is the case in JADE-S as every
agent-name has to be unique within the platform.
However,  very little  is  done to protect  agents from being attacked once they run in a  remote
container. In fact, the guide for secure JADE [39] advises to turn of mobility in the platform as mobility
related security permissions are still  missing. Thus,  requirements with respect  to  protection of  entities,
agents and host data are not satisfied. Further research in this area is needed, e.g. consideration of possible
attacks. Also, it is questionable how unauthorized access to logs and administrative data could be prevented
in JADE (requirement 11).
AgentScape
The  scenario  as  proposed  above  can  also  be  implemented  in  the  AgentScape  agent  platform  [15].
AgentScape is designed to support open, large-scale distributed agent systems in a secure environment with
support for fault-tolerance, security, heterogeneity and interoperability. The concepts in AgentScape are
agents, objects, services and locations. Locations provide a runtime environment for agents with mobility
4  http://www.semoa.org/
5  http://jade.tilab.com/
6  http://www.cougaar.org/
and communication facilities. Services, for example Directory Services, provide information and perform
actions upon request of agents, other services and the AgentScape middleware. 
In the multimedia scenario as proposed above, AgentScape provides the user and service provider
each with their own locations and also offers support for multiple hosts within one location (specially useful
for the service provider). Migration of agents between locations is supported and user locations can be
dynamically connected  and disconnected.  The Web Service Gateway (WSG) for  Internet  and database
interactions is another feature of AgentScape.
Various security features, which relate to requirements mentioned above, have been implemented
in AgentScape. The use of global and local identities, leasing of resources, sandboxing of agents, signing
agent’s code and its state, and secure communication are the most prominent. 
Within AgentScape agents have a globally unique identifier, and a locally unique identifier within
the location in which they reside (satisfying requirements 1 and 8). The use of leases for resource access
and  monitoring  of  resource  usage  provides  means  to  ensure  availability  [26].  To  prevent  unwanted
interactions by agents with other entities, e.g. to protect the host on which the agent is running, agents are
‘sandboxed’ or ‘jailed’.
For agent and agent state protection, e.g. to guarantee integrity of the agent’s code and data, an
agent  and its  data  are  stored in an Agent Container  [14,  9].  The  AgentScape  platform implements an
integrity verification mechanism based on signing of the Agent Containers. This fulfils the requirement
concerning protection and detection measures to safeguard the integrity of the agent. Note that this Agent
Container concept differs from the JADE Agent Container concept: in AgentScape, it is a storage medium,
whereas in JADE it is a runtime environment for the agents. 
Communication between hosts in AgentScape, e.g. for the purpose of agent migration, has been
secured. Mutually authenticated, encrypted channels are set up using a key exchange protocol at the host-to-
host level. Thus, the requirement of protection of transmissions is met.
Efforts to improve AgentScape and its security are still ongoing – in particular, policies for logging. 
5 Summary and future research
This article describes a scenario in which a mobile agent moves to the location of the service provider and
searches a multimedia database on behalf of its user. In this scenario, an intermediary (the guardian agent)
is used to communicate the search results to the user and take care of final arrangements. A number of legal
and technical issues are discussed in the context of an agent-based multimedia retrieval scenario. 
Note that the various requirements are highly interrelated and that there is no 1-to-1 mapping of
measures taken and requirement(s). For example, requirement 1, specifying the need for local identification
of  agents  and  users  partly  overlaps  with  requirement  8  on  unique  identifiability  of  agents  and  also
requirement 1 more or less implies requirement 2 (which states that agent and user identity information
needs to be managed). Furthermore, the requirement on privacy of information in the system, relates to (the
implementation  of)  all  the  requirements  on  identity  management,  integrity  and  logs  and  traceability.
Additionally,  privacy may be  covered  in  agreements  on  a  privacy policy,  thus  also  involving the  last
requirement on the need for clear and legally valid agreements. 
A number of  questions  from section  3  still  need to  be  addressed.  Firstly,  how to  do  identity
management  in  mobile  agent  systems  needs  further  research.  Facilities  are  needed  for  identity
administration.  Entities,  e.g.  users  and  agents,  should  to  be  able  to  operate  anonymously  or  pseudo-
anonymously.  However,  under  certain  circumstances,  information  may be  needed  with  respect  to  the
identity of the user, therefore information on the identities has to be managed and be accessible for entities
with appropriate credentials. Another open issue regards identity management of possible agent’s clones,
children and helpers. 
Secondly,  there is the issue of  logging in distributed mobile  agent environments.  Protocols  need to be
developed to propagate updates according to specific policies. These issues appear to be related to update
propagation in distributed object systems. The theories and techniques developed for object systems may be
applicable to agent systems as well, though complicated by agent mobility.
Thirdly,  further  research  is  needed  in  mobile  agent  and  security  issues,  e.g.  agents  carrying  and
communicating confidential information. In case a mobile agent visits a variety of service providers, it may
need to keep secret or prove possession of certain information, e.g. passwords and private keys, to others
than its user. Protocols are needed to check the credentials or certificates of a migratory agent.
 An example of an agent platform within which a number of these issues are addressed has been briefly
discussed describing the technical feasibility of a number of the suggested solutions.  It is clear that further
research is needed.
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